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Abstract  
The crisis in Kosovo, which has developed 
over the course of a decade into a conflict 
involving more states than any since 
World War II has resulted in the 
displacement of almost the entire Kosovar-
Albanian population, as well as of a great 
many Serbs and other regional 
populations. The European Union (EU) 
memberstates have prided themselves on 
their unity of action under NATO, in 
tackling this crisis. However, there has 
been no unity of policy toward the" refu-
gees" -in spite of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, with its goal of 'an 
area of freedom security and justice' 
involving a common asylum and immi-
gration policy. 1 The most frequently heard 
arguments for the reluctance to accept 
Kosovars in EU states are that this would 
only encourage ethnic cleansing, and that 
EU states already have too many 
immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees 
who will not go home. The position of the 
"refugees" is thus a politically difficult 
one, and becomes a security issue in many 
senses. In this article, the author explores 
some ideas about the nature of the nexus 
between refugees (and migration more 
generally) and security in the post-Cold 
War world. In doing this, she will set out 
to critique the writings on 'societal 
security' in particular, posing the key 
question as to where exactly the threat lies 
as far as refugees are concerned.  
Resume  
La crise du Kosovo, qui s' est d€veloppe 
en une decennie pour deboucher sur un 
conflit impliquant Ie plus grand nombre d' 
etats depuis la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 
a eu pour resultat Ie deplacement de la 
quasi totaliU de la population kosovarde 
de souche albanaise, ainsi que d'un grand 
nombre de serbes et autres  
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segments de population locale. Les etats 
membres de 1'Union Europeenne(UE) se 
sont glorifies de leur unite d' action sous 
couvert de l' aT AN lors de leur prise en 
charge de la crise. Cependant, il n'y a eu 
aucune unite de doctrine sur la question 
des «refugies» - et ce en depit de l' entree 
en vigueurdu traited'Amsterdam, avec ses 
objectifs de mise en place «d' une zone de 
liberte, de securite, et de justice» impli-
quant asile commun et politique d' immi-
gration. L' argument Ie plus frequemment 
avance pour expliquer la resistance des 
etats de 1'UE a accueillir des Kosovars 
est celui selon lequel cela representerait 
un encouragement implicite a la purifica-
tion ethnique. S'y ajoute l'idee selon la-
quelle les etats de l'UE comptent deja trap 
d'immigrants, de demandeurs d' asile, et 
de refugies qui ne rentreront plus chez 
eux. Consequemment la position de «re-
fugib> est uneposition politique difficile, 
et pose, de plusieurs points de vue, des 
problemes de securite. Dans Ie present 
article, l' auteure developpe un certain 
nombre de considerations sur la nature du 
point nodal entre refugies (et immigration, 
de far;on plus generale) et securite dans 
Ie monde de l' apres Guerre froide. Ce 
faisant, elle procede a la critique d' un 
certain nombre de travaux, notamment 
ceux traitant de la «securite societale», et 
souleve la question clef suivante: ou 
reside exactement la menace en ce qui 
concerne les refugies?  
Refugees and other displaced persons 
face and have faced human, personal, 
community and societal security viola-
tions whose impact far exceeds that of 
any security threats faced by West 
Europeans since World War II. States 
have long agreed upon their duties and 
obligations to one another, and to those 
individualscast out into the 
international system. Any threatto, or 
violation of, the security of a person 
who, by virtue of this threat, becomes a 
refugee (someone without state 
protection in a world where such 
protection is deemed neces-  
 
sary) is, therefore, of concern to the 
international community. The cause of 
refugeehood is of concern, because the 
protection of the refugee is an interna-
tional concern. To confront those 
causes, other states should, I suggest, 
welcome and nurture refugees as peo-
ple who can survive to re-invigorate 
and bring back to normalcy the society 
of their country of origin once a 
security crisis is over.2 By including the 
excluded, most states and societies will 
demonstrate and reinforce their nature, 
or identity, as humane and dynamic. 
They will also promote the rejection of 
racism and xenophobia. The ethnic 
cleansing perpetrated by a leader such 
as Milosevic should not be echoed by 
ethnic exclusion, to the satisfaction of 
West European racists.  
The literature emanating from what 
has been labelled "The Copenhagen 
School" has played a significant role in 
raising awareness and driving thinking 
in academic circles about the nexus 
between security and migration.3 The 
emerging school of thought around 
"societal security" and other aspects of 
the "new security framework" posits, in 
essence, that threats to identities are the 
basis of the new security concerns. The 
threa t recipient need not necessarily be 
the state, as has traditionally been the 
case in past considerations of security 
issues in international relations; a 
threat-recipient can also be another 
"unit," such as sub-national or trans-
national society. In general, however, it 
becomes difficult, both for the writers 
concerned and their readers, to distin-
guish between societal units and na-
tional units, or societies and states. A~ 
Shaw points out, W aever' s 
contribution on societal security in his 
1993 book presents a novel and 
potentially highly useful sociological 
attitude towards security, which he no 
sooner developed than rejected.4 He 
posited, citing Giddens, a distinction 
between society "in the generalized 
connotation of 'so-  
 47 
cial association' or interaction," and in 
the sense of " a society" with 
boundaries marking it off from other 
societies. But he then rejected both 
social associations and any notion of a 
global society, and limited himself 
instead to a definition of society which 
he wanted to complement the role of 
states, but which, in fact, restricted 
societies to being understandable only 
in the form of existing states.5 Since 
the identity of the society or state is 
what is at issue as the value to be 
protected, we are then back to a situa-
tion where "national interest" equates 
to "societal values" or "identity," and a 
static identity becomes the most pre-
cious commodity a state holds. All 
states being equally formed actors in 
the anarchical system, if of differing 
strength, we are back to traditional 
realism.  
As a "problem-solving" theory, what 
this "new" form ofrealismis trying to do 
is to seek a way of understanding what 
the problem is with our world, and to 
solve it. 6 One problem identified by 
this theory is that some features (e.g., 
culture, politics, religion, language) of 
state or societal identity (which, as was 
already said, is reduced to the same 
thing) may be challenged or threatened 
by the presence of others. This 
presupposes that identity is a static and 
easily recognisable feature of society. 
This theory also suggests that identity, 
equated with national security, has 
often been challenged by non-citizens-
immigrants and refugees-in the past. 
Identities, attached to states, nations or 
societies, have surely developed over 
the last millenni a-often because people 
from other parts of the world have 
travelled, invaded, colonised, and/ or 
have moved to work or out of interest. 
Many people would consider this 
dynamic of identity a positive feature 
of global development, and would 
employ such terms as "multi-cultural," 
"cosmopolitan" and "globalization" to 
describe them. There are very few stark 
cases of actual, objectively identifiable 
threats from immigrants which do 
spring to mind: the World Trade Center 
bombers in the United States were 
indeed "asylum seekers," or were 
atleast (ab )using that entry category in 
order to be present in the United States. 
The many thou-  
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sands of Hungarian refugees of 1956 
and the Czechoslovakian refugees of 
1967, were not rejected on the grounds 
that their presence would threaten 
societal security, but rather were ac-
cepted with open arms as challengers 
to, and people threatened by, the Com-
munistenemy. Kosovar-Albaniansare 
also challengers to, and threatened by, 
the war criminal Milosevic and his re-
gime: but there is no welcome 
orprotection for them.  
Another problem one could say is 
(indirectly) identified by these "new" 
realist scholars, through a different 
reading of their work, is that of racism 
and xenophobia; however, the solution 
prescibed remains that immigration 
should be stopped. This logic suggests 
that if there are no immigrants, there 
will be no xenophobia or racism; 
hence, so there should be no 
immigrants. This logic is severely 
flawed, because racism and xenophobia 
is not caused by immigrants, but by the 
attitudes of existing members of the 
society receiving those immigrants. 
Jews werenotresponsible for the 
phenomenon we call Nazism: 
immigrants are similarly not responsi-
ble for the phenomenon we label 
racism and xenophobia. What is more, 
those subscribing to this notion of 
societal security suggest that if there 
are no immigrants, our identity will be 
unchallenged, since there will be no 
challenge from either the immigrants 
with their "other" cultures, or from 
those racists and xenophobes who pose 
enormous questions about what exactly 
being British, French, German, Dutch 
or of any other nationality signifies. I 
would agree that racism and 
xenophobia are serious threats to all 
societies which claim a humanitarian 
identity-but the exclusion of refugees 
and immigrants will not solve that 
particular problem.  
This "solution" unfortunately, 
misses the true link between refugees 
and security. In the process, it also 
gives support to racist and xenophobic 
ideas, although this risk may not have 
been realised, since these thinkers also 
suggest that" securitizing" immigration 
is not necessarily a useful approach.7 
However, to recognize the potential 
abuse to which such theorising lends  
 
itself is not sufficient: one needs to go 
further, both by pursuing the question 
of where exactly the security issue lies 
in refugee movements, and by 
developing further the theoretical 
notion of society as a useful concept in 
security thinking. Given the space 
available here, the scope of this article 
will be restricted to theformer.8  
A more appropriate approach to the 
question of how migration and security 
may be linked, and particularly where 
the link enters from a refugee perspec-
tive, would be to consider the sort of 
threats and violations of security that 
refugees face, which (in realist terms) 
force them out from the protection of 
their state of origin. In migration 
studies terms, this does not necessarily 
return us to unresolved "root causes" 
debate. Rather, it prompts us to pose 
questions about the linkages between 
the causes of forced migration, the type 
of protection offered to refugees, and 
the locus of challenge to the protecting 
s tate in refugee situations.  
The whole point of creating refugee 
law was always to develop a form of 
protection for people who had lost the 
protection of their state of origin. 9 That 
is what differentiates economic mi-
grants from refugees: an economic mi-
grant still has the citizenship and 
protection of his or her state of origin; a 
refugee enjoys no such protection. En-
joying no such protection, those forced 
to flee should have the right to" seek 
and enjoy asylum in countries other 
than their own."lO The views expressed 
in academic terms by the Copenhagen 
School, and those expressed politically 
both by extreme right-wing parties and, 
increasingly, by mainstream parties 
(and not only those of the right), mean 
that in practice, those displaced by con-
flicts such as that in Kosovo cannot re-
alize this rightto seek and enjoy 
asylum, or even forms of protection 
which accord them fewer rights than 
asylum does, in countries further away 
than the states bordering their country 
of origin. 11  
In such a situation, the internally 
displaced or "refugees" do indeed be-
come part of a heightened security situ-
ation. This is not because of who they  
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are as individuals or, necessarily, be-
cause of their position as a group with 
any particular religious or ethnic iden-
tity, which may tip the "balance" of a 
population, causing additional minority 
tensions. Rather, it is because, in a mass 
exodus situation such as that from 
Kosovo from March to June 1999, the 
neighbouring states, which are often 
poor-as indeed both Albania and 
Macedonia (FYROM) are, cannot effi-
ciently or sufficiently protect the refu-
gees. Perhaps the only protection they 
can offer is that of non-refoulement.12 
They cannot provide the shelter, the 
travel documents, the food required by 
refugees; they cannot support the refu-
gees' rights to employment and educa-
tion and, if employment is found, they 
cannot collect the taxes, of those who 
seek asylum within their borders. They 
cannot because they lack the capaCity 
to do so. One result of this incapacity 
may be various forms of societal unrest, 
among the "refugees" and among the 
host population.  
However, the "refugees" do not 
threaten the stability of those neigh-
bouring states. The threat comes from 
the state of origin which ceased to pro-
tect the people concerned, and from the 
wider community of states which 
refuses to live up to its obligations to 
offer protection to those who are denied 
the normal protection of their state of 
origin. The further threat, for the whole 
international community, is that keep-
ing the "refugees" close to their state of 
origin only encourages a geographic 
widening of the conflict-either when 
fighters among the refugees (in the 
Kosovars' case, the KLA-Kosovo Lib-
eration Army) continue to fight across 
the border or use the border "refugee" 
camps as bases, or when the forces in 
the state of origin continue their attacks 
on the fleeing population across an 
internationally recognised frontier. In 
either case, this security threat would 
clearly be avoided if the "refugees" 
were not only permitted, but if they 
were encouraged, to move to protection 
further away. It is of course convenient, 
under the circumstances, that Kosovar-
Albanians have often been heard to 
claim that they do not want to move far 
from  
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home. For many this may be true, but it 
is clearly not for those who, to seek the 
protection they need and deserve, have 
surrendered all their remaining goods 
and money to human smugglers. The 
fact that "refugees" need to turn to 
smugglers only reinforces all the secu-
rity arguments around this issue. But if 
their human rights were being re-
spected by ED states, there would be 
no need for them to buy the services of 
a smuggler, orto bribe their way up the 
list of evacuees on the minimal quotas 
which were established.  
A further argument for suggesting 
that Kosovo's "refugees" should have 
been accepted, welcomed and 
protected in greater numbers in ED 
states is that those very states had 
intervened in the crisis prior to the 
cross-border movement of most of the 
displaced. Their displacement was not 
necessarily directly or even indirectly 
caused by the NATO bombs. However, 
the intervention by NATO states-
proclaimed as being motivated by 
humanitarian concerns, pure and 
simple-implied a morally unavoidable 
duty to protect those humans whose 
suffering the outside states were 
already seeking to alleviate by their use 
of force in what they called a just 
cause.13 Besides living up to their 
humanitarian claims, NATO and ED 
states would then have been in a posi-
tion to counter Milosevic's ethnic 
cleansing (in terms of displacement) by 
ensuring that a minimum oJ ethnic 
killing could take place, and by demon-
strating how tolerant of ethnic differ-
ences their own societies are. Instead, 
using the ethnic cleansing argument, 
ED states demonstrated their (perhaps 
pragmatic, perhaps not) belief that their 
societies are as intolerant as President 
Milosevic and his followers-even if, in 
general, they are not quite so violent in 
their expressions of racism and xeno-
phobia.  
If one considers the various 
potential and real objects of security, 
and asks what is threatening in a 
situation such as the crisis in and 
around Kosovo in 1999 and before, one 
arrives, I would suggest, at a common 
cause for all security concerns. What 
was the threat to regional and 
international security?  
 
Intolerance by the Serbian regime. 
What was the threat to the human and 
individual security of the Kosovar-
Albanians? Intolerance by the Serbian 
regime. What was the threatto the 
societal security of the "autonomous" 
region of Kosovo? Intolerance by the 
Serbian regime. What was the threat to 
the societal security of Albania and 
Macedonia? Intolerance by the Serbian 
regime. What possible threat was there 
to ED, and individual member states'" 
societal security"? Intolerance by the 
Serbian regime. In this last case, one 
could add the intolerance of racists and 
xenophobes, just as in the penultimate 
case one could add, for Macedonia, the 
intolerance of the local Slav 
community. However, the individual 
refugees or groups of refugees 
themselves posed, in general, no threat. 
Some of them may be people who 
would seek to abuse the hospitality of a 
protecting state. But the vast majority, 
rather than representing a threat, are the 
victims of threats and more: they are 
the victims of intolerance, which seems 
to be their lot almost everywhere they 
turn .•  
Notes  
1. I am reluctant to use the word "refugee" 
without inverted commas, to indicate that, 
while everyday language describes the 
Kosovar-Albanians now, collectively, as 
refugees, there are very few who in fact are 
fortunate enough to have their right to enjoy 
this status recognised. A refugee is someone 
who is granted the full protection as agreed 
upon under various international 
instruments, including the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
Either a state or the UNHCRmust recognize 
a person as a refugee, granting protection to 
someone who no longer enjoys, or cannot 
enjoy, the protection of their state of origin. 
Such protection has been granted to very 
few of those escaping the violence in 
Kosovo; thus, the people involved are not, 
strictly speaking, refugees, but rather are 
displaced persons or, in some cases, people 
with temporary protection. This point is not 
petty, as it gets to the heart of the security 
questions surrounding "refugees": what 
security do these members of global society 
have if no state will recognize them as 
refugees?  
2. Many refugees do, in fact, return to their 
country of origin, even if this does not al-
ways take place within a short period of  
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time after the resolution of the cause of their 
flight. A great many Chileans who fled in 
the 1970s returned in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Likewise, programs of return 
such as that in Mozambique resulted in a 
high number of repatriations.  
3. The key "products" of the "Copenhagen 
School" are: B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. 
Lemaitre, E. Tromer, and O. Waever, The 
European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for 
the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 
1990); B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An 
Agendafor International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Hemel Hempstead:  
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991,2nd edition); O. 
Waever, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. 
Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 
1993) and B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de 
Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analy-
sis (London: Lynne Reiner, 1998).  
4. See M. Shaw, Global Society and Interna-
tional Relations (London: Polity, 1994),101.  
5. Waever, et al., Identity, Migration 00" op. cit., 
19.  
 
6. See R. Cox, "Social Forces, States and 
World Orders: Beyond International Rela-
tions Theory," Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981) 
on the distinction between problem solving 
and cri tical theories.  
7. J. Huysmans, "The Question of the Limit:  
Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of 
Horror in Political Realism," Millennium 27, 
no. 3 (1998).  
8. A start to critical security thinking has been 
made in, e.g., K Krause, and M. Williams, 
(eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and 
Cases (London: UCL, 1997). However, 
where the migration issue is concerned, 
there remains a long way to go.  
9. See,e.g.,G.S.Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 1996 2nd 
edition); A. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. 
Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and 
the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World 
(Oxford: OUP, 1989); J. Hathaway, The Law 
of Refugee Status (Toronto:  
Butterworths, 1991); G. Loescher, and L.  
 
Monahan, (eds.) Refugees and International 
Relations (Oxford: OUP, 1990).  
10. Article 14, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
II, See J. van Selm -Thorburn, Refugee Protection 
in Europe: Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) for 
details of other protection categories, and 
particularly temporary protection as granted 
to Bosnians in various EU states. Temporary 
protection is here placed in the context of a 
comprehensive approach, including security 
issues and humanitarian intervention.  
12. Non-return: Article330fthe 1951 Convention.  
13. See M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence 
of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford:  
Blackwell, 1985); and M. Walzer, Just and 
Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1992, 
2nd edition) for strong ethical reasoning for 
this position. Ll  
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• Somali Refugees in Toronto:  
A Profile  
By Edward Opoku-Dapaah, 1995 
ISBN I-55014-278-x, 130 pp., $12.95.  
This is the first comprehensive study of So-
mali refugees in Toronto. It examines the 
social, residential, and linguistic characteristic 
of Somalis, their participation in the local 
economy, and the activity of Somali commu-
nity organizations. The report also contains 
valuable suggestions and recommendations 
concerning suitable and more efficient service 
delivery to this community.  
• Cambodian Refugees in Ontario:  
An Evaluation of Resettlement 
and Adaptation  
By Janet Mclellan, 1995  
ISBN 1-55014-267:4, 142 pp., $12.95.  
This major study of Cambodian refugees in 
Ontario examines the effects of various forms 
of sponsorship on Cambodian resettlement. It 
also focuses and the linguistic, economic, 
educational, training and social dimensions of 
the whole process of adaptation. The delivery 
of services by governmental and NGO 
agencies as well as the effects of the past 
traumatic experiences of genocide and mass 
starvation on Cambodian refugees are fully 
discussed.  
• Refugee Families and Children:  
A Directory for Service Providers 
in Metro Toronto  
Compiled by  
John Morris and Lydia Sawicki, 1995 
ISBN 1-55014-285-2, 39 pp., $6.95.  
This directory is designed for service 
providers who work with refugee families and 
children in Metro Toronto. Its aim is to 
improve service provision through networking 
and the sharing of training opportunities.  
Available from:  
Centre for Refugee Studies  
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